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Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication†
By Inga Deimen and Dezso˝ Szalay*
A decision maker needs to reach a decision and relies on an expert 
to acquire information. Ideal actions of expert and decision maker 
are partially aligned and the expert chooses what to learn about 
each. The decision maker can either get advice from the expert or 
 delegate decision making to him. Under delegation, the expert learns 
his  privately optimal action and chooses it. Under  communication, 
advice based on such information is discounted, resulting in losses 
from strategic communication. We characterize the communication 
problems that make the expert acquire information of equal use 
to expert and decision maker. In these problems, communication 
 outperforms delegation. (JEL D82, D83) 
Good decision making requires good information. Except perhaps for  routine 
decisions, such information is not readily available but must be actively acquired. 
Pressed for time, decision makers often have to delegate this job to others. We 
take this situation of delegated expertise1 as our starting point and wonder what 
 mechanism of decision making should ideally complement it? Should the  decision 
maker  delegate decision making to the expert as well, or should she keep authority 
over decision making and have the expert report back to her? This paper makes a 
case for communication as a complement to delegated expertise, providing condi-
tions under which communication unambiguously dominates delegated decision 
making.
We envision a decision problem that involves a change of policy away from some 
known status quo, e.g., adapting a design to new market conditions,  adjusting a 
 portfolio in response to new information, choosing a new project, adapting a  business 
plan in response to changes in the environment of the firm, and so on. Naturally, the 
status quo is the optimal action based on the information currently available, but 
1 Demski and Sappington (1987) have coined this term. An expert is an agent endowed with a technology to 
acquire information.
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additional information will likely lead to a revision of plans. The  decision maker can 
consult an expert for advice or help. The contractual options for the  decision maker 
are incomplete (Grossman and Hart 1986 and Hart and Moore 1990): as in Aghion 
and Tirole (1997), the decision maker can only choose the  allocation of  authority. 
That is, she can either simply ask for advice or entrust the expert with  decision 
making altogether. In contrast to their approach, the  decision maker has no time or 
means to become informed herself. However, she can communicate with the expert 
and infer her preferred action indirectly, at least to some extent.2
We construct a novel model with linear Bayesian updating rules in which the deci-
sion maker’s inferred optimal action is a compromise between the expert’s  preferred 
action and the status quo. The expert observes noisy signals about the optimal actions 
from his and the decision maker’s perspective; he is free to choose the  precision 
of each of the signals. We think of a transparent environment where the expert’s 
 information acquisition is overt, as is the case, e.g., for in-house  consulting. While 
the precision levels of the signals are observable, the actual realizations are privately 
observed by the expert. We abstract from real costs of information  acquisition and 
focus on the strategic costs of different information acquisition  strategies instead. 
The extent to which the decision maker follows the expert’s advice depends  crucially 
on what type of information the expert acquires. Moreover, when allocating author-
ity the decision maker takes into account that the expert’s information acquisition 
will depend on her choice of institution.
Our main findings are as follows. If the decision maker transfers formal  authority 
to the expert, then the expert acquires perfect information about his  preferred 
action and takes it. The decision maker benefits from this policy, but only to some 
extent. The advantage is that the expert’s action policy is highly sensitive to his 
 information, the disadvantage is that the policy is optimal from the expert’s per-
spective, not the decision maker’s. Imagine now that the decision maker keeps for-
mal authority so that the expert has to report back to her. If the expert followed the 
same information acquisition strategy, then the decision maker would discount the 
expert’s advice, resulting in losses from strategic communication. Moreover, if the 
losses from strategic communication are sufficiently sensitive to the expert’s bias, 
then the expert has incentives to avoid this situation and to eliminate the bias. The 
optimal information acquisition strategy has the following features in this case. The 
expert acquires perfect information about the preferred action from the decision 
maker’s perspective. Moreover, he acquires only a noisy signal about the optimal 
action from his perspective. That is, he remains partially ignorant about his own 
preferred choice, to signal credibly to the decision maker that his advice is useful 
to her. The expert benefits only to some extent from the resulting action policy. 
However, this is still better than perfectly knowing the ideal action but not getting 
the decision maker to follow his advice.
Put differently, an expert who wishes to have a pronounced impact on the 
 decision maker’s choices needs to acquire information of primary concern to the 
decision maker and needs to reassure the decision maker of his unbiasedness. Our 
analysis reveals that biased advice is less effective if extreme disagreement between 
2 In Aghion and Tirole (1997), an uninformed individual would stick to the status quo, because there exist 
 disastrous projects. We drop this assumption.
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expert and decision maker is likely. The reason is that communication based on 
expert-optimal information has very little impact on the decision maker’s choice and 
hence does not work well. The shadow of such ineffective communication makes 
the expert avoid these kind of situations and gives him incentives to acquire receiver 
relevant information.
We draw upon and contribute to several literatures. Our first contribution is to 
introduce a rich model of information and strategic information transmission à la 
Crawford and Sobel (1982) into a problem of adapting to new information. The 
defining feature of the problem is that there is no conflict of interest with respect 
to the status quo; conflicts arise only ex post depending on the information that is 
acquired. In contrast to known models, conflicts are endogenous here and  intertwined 
with information. We develop a new set of linear models that allow for closed form 
expressions of the value of information. The technique to compute these closed 
forms is new to the literature.3 Likewise is the statistical model, that allows for 
linear updating in a more tractable way than the multivariate Normal case allows.4 
The model is rich enough to allow us to quantify the effectiveness of biased  strategic 
 communication, a measure of the amount of information transmitted through stra-
tegic communication. Making this kind of comparative statics analysis feasible is 
perhaps the major contribution of this paper.
Adapting to news is a natural application, but our approach is not confined 
to such problems; different scenarios give rise to the same abstract incentive 
 problems. For example, think of a situation where incentive contracts have 
been used to align  incentives with respect to everything that is known already. 
Information arriving after this contracting stage still creates conflicts, e.g., when 
a project- or  division-manager’s pay depends on the division’s profit to a greater 
extent than  overall profits do. Likewise, in the financial industry, even if  regulation 
makes every effort to eliminate known conflicts of interests, requesting perfect 
foresight is  probably asking too much. Similarly, differences in the lengths of 
time horizons may create wedges of the sort envisioned here. For example, a 
 consultant will care  relatively more about the short-term impact of his advice than 
the advised firm does.5 Plain and simple, our analysis predicts that communication 
serves to align  incentives in these contexts, when news likely induces pronounced 
revisions of plans. For  example, in financial decision making this is the case if 
return  distributions have fat tails; in corporate decisions, this is the case if the firm 
is likely to expand substantially into the new market or retreat completely from it.
Our paper adds to the comparison of institutions. Dessein (2002)  investigates 
the optimal allocation of authority in a decision problem à la Crawford and Sobel 
(1982) in which the informed party is uniformly biased in one direction. Delegation 
entails a loss of control, communication a loss from strategic  information 
 transmission. Delegation outperforms communication if the bias is small. We look 
3 In particular, our approach differs from Goltsman et al. (2009) and Alonso and Rantakari (2013) where payoffs 
arising from mediated talk are used to determine upper bounds on the value of communication.
4 The idea is to construct the multivariate distribution from marginals with linear updating inference rules based 
on  truncations to the tails—linear tail conditional expectations. In addition, the classical linear conditional expec-
tations rules apply. Our leading case is the joint Laplace distribution (Kotz, Kozubowski, and Podgórski 2001). 
However, we describe the entire class with these features. See Section VII for details.
5 See Antic and Persico (2017), among other results, for an analysis of conflicts due to differences in time 
horizons.
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at the optimal allocation of authority in problems of acquiring and adapting to new 
information, or more generally, in problems where a priori known biases have been 
eliminated. We characterize environments with endogenous biases in which com-
munication always outperforms delegation.6
The comparison of institutions has implications for the organization of 
 hierarchies. The literature has studied the interplay between adaptation and 
 coordination  problems (see Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek 2008 and Rantakari 
2008). In particular, it is shown that decentralized decision making is better than 
centralized decision making for small conflicts of interests and the reverse is true 
for larger conflicts. Our present approach abstracts from the coordination motive 
and shows that information acquisition may tilt the dice in favor of communication. 
Our results have parallels in richer hierarchies. In companion work, (Deimen and 
Szalay forthcoming), we allow for information provision in an organization with 
division of labor and show that the optimal information provision by a headquarters 
aligns incentives. Thus, the informational policy of the organization may serve as a 
substitute for the allocation of authority.
We contribute to the literature on information acquisition in communica-
tion problems.7 Most closely related in terms of conclusions is Argenziano, 
Severinov, and Squintani (2016), which allows for endogenous information 
acquisition in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model. Similar to our findings they 
show that  communication creates better incentives for information acquisition 
than  delegation. Roughly speaking, both papers use the threat of bad commu-
nication off the  equilibrium path to discipline the sender’s information acquisi-
tion. Argenziano, Severinov, and Squintani (2016) show that this threat implies a 
higher marginal value of information under communication than under delegation 
so that the sender acquires more information under communication. Intuitively, if 
the receiver does not listen in case the sender does not acquire the right amount 
of information, then communication can create very strong incentives for infor-
mation acquisition in the overt mode. However, this effect is robust to allowing 
for different beliefs off equilibrium path and also holds when information acqui-
sition is covert, albeit for a different reason.8 In the present paper, we study overt 
information acquisition and argue that the threat of bad communication serves 
to discipline the sender to acquire the right pieces of information. When biased 
communication is sufficiently ineffective the sender prefers to avoid having a bias 
by acquiring information that correlates better with the decision maker’s preferred 
choice. While both papers emphasize a virtue of communication, our argument 
is based on fundamentally different forces. We face a different decision problem 
6 Communication in adaptation problems with similar (linear) reduced forms have been studied, e.g., 
by Melumad and Shibano (1991) and Stein (1989). The most general analysis is due to Gordon (2010). Our 
 contribution is the rich informational model. For tractability, we assume quadratic loss functions, which is more 
structure than Dessein (2002) imposes.
7 See Austen-Smith (1994) for an early and Pei (2015) for a recent contribution. The effects of better 
information are studied in Moscarini (2007) and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006). Blume, Board, and Kawamura 
(2007) study noise in communication.
8 Under covert information acquisition, the set of actions that the sender can induce is determined by how 
much information acquisition the receiver expects. This can make the life of a sender who shirks on informa-
tion  acquisition particularly unpleasant. See Eso˝ and Szalay (2017) for an argument showing that a rich language 
reduces the incentive to become informed for related reasons.
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with conflicts that arise endogenously ex post—as a function of the information 
that is acquired—but are absent ex ante. Moreover, we require a multi-dimensional 
approach: a two-dimensional state and signal space to understand the sender’s 
incentives to learn about one or the other dimension of the state space. Finally, to 
make this problem tractable, we develop a general theory of location experiments 
with linear posteriors which is new to the literature.9
Clearly, our analysis has its limitations. In the incomplete contracting 
approach, actions are not contractible. If they were, then much more complicated 
institutions, in particular optimally constrained delegation, would become 
 feasible.10 In the  context of information acquisition, a problem of this sort is 
 analyzed in Szalay (2005). The optimal way to deal with a problem of moral 
 hazard in information acquisition is to prohibit actions that are optimal given prior 
information. Allowing for costs and contractible actions is an extension worth 
 pursuing. We stick to the case of overt and costless information acquisition here, 
as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). This is a reasonable description of an 
in-house consultant who is to combine his knowledge with the data owned by 
the firm. It is very easy to monitor which files the  consultant requests and which 
not. The crucial assumption is that the expert can somehow generate this kind 
of  transparency. With covert information acquisition the expert would have no 
incentive to adjust his information acquisition and communication would per-
form badly. Thus, if he can, the expert wants to choose the overt mode.11
The paper is structured as follows. In Section I, we introduce the model. In 
Section  II, we prove an essential reduction that serves to simplify the  analysis 
 dramatically and explain the convenient linearity features of our environ-
ment. We characterize equilibria at the communication stage in Section  III and 
derive the value of information arising from communication in Section  IV. 
Proceeding  backwards along the timeline, we study the expert’s incentives to 
acquire  information in Section  V and then draw the implications for the choice 
of  institutions in Section  VI. To this point, our analysis is confined to our 
leading case, the joint Laplace  distribution. In Section VII, we generalize our  findings 
to a rich class of informational models with linear updating rules, all ordered by a sin-
gle parameter that captures the effectiveness of biased  communication. Section VIII 
looks at a variation in timing. Section IX discusses a number of extensions and con-
cludes our investigation. All longer proofs are  gathered in online appendices, proofs 
of theorems are discussed in the text.
9 For multi-dimensional models, see Battaglini (2002), Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007), and Levy and Razin 
(2007). Our aggregation model, with a two-dimensional state and a one-dimensional action space has not yet been 
studied. Our approach differs also from the one taken in random bias models, such as Li and Madarász (2008), 
Dimitrakas and Sarafidis (2005), and Morgan and Stocken (2003), which typically look at state-independent biases.
10 For an analysis of such institutions, see Holmström (1984), Alonso and Matouschek (2008), and Amador 
and Bagwell (2013).
11 We thank Steve Matthews for pointing this out to us.
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I. The Model
A. The Decision Problem
A decision maker, henceforth the receiver, needs to reach a decision  y ∈ ℝ . The 
ideal decision from her point of view depends on the realization  ω of a random 
 variable  ω ̃ . More precisely, the payoff of the receiver is
  u r ( y, ω ) = − ( y − ω ) 2 . 
Unfortunately, the receiver does not know  ω . However, before taking the action, she 
can consult an expert, henceforth referred to as the sender. The sender’s preferences 
over actions are given by the function
  u s ( y, η ) = − ( y − η ) 2 , 
where  η is the realization of a random variable  η ̃. We denote  ( ω, η ) the state of the 
world. We assume that the random variables  ω ̃ and  η ̃ each have a mean of 0, so 
that the sender and the receiver agree that the status quo action,  y = 0 , is optimal 
absent additional information. Moreover,  ω ̃ and  η ̃ have identical variances  σ 2 and 
are positively correlated with coefficient of correlation  ρ =  σ ω η / σ 2 ∈ ( 0, 1) .12 
The sender does not know the state either, but he can observe signals  s ω = ω +  ε ω 
and  s η = η +  ε η that reveal the state with noise. We assume that the noise terms are 
uncorrelated with each other and with the state. We write  τ ≡ (ω , η ,  ε ω ,  ε η ) with 
typical element  τ and let Σ denote the covariance matrix.13
We introduce a class of distributions that is particularly suited to study 
updating combined with strategic communication. Our leading case is the joint 
Laplace distribution, with well known marginal density  f τ (τ ) =  1 _2 λ  e −λ  | τ |  for 
λ =   √ 
_ 2 _ σ τ  on support  ℝ and characteristic function  Φ(t) =  1 _ 1 +  1 _2  t 2  σ τ 2 . Following, for 
example, Kotz, Kozubowski, and Podgórski (2001), the joint Laplace distribution is 
defined by the same characteristic function,  Φ(𝐭) =  1 _ 
1 +  1 _2t 'Σt
. It belongs to the class 
of elliptical distributions.14 We explain in detail in Section II why this environment 
is useful and generalize our analysis beyond the Laplace case in Section VII.
12 Our analysis easily extends to not too asymmetric prior variances. The model is interesting only if  ρ > 0 , 
because no meaningful communication is possible for  ρ ≤ 0 .
13 Formally, we assume
  Σ =  
⎛
 ⎜
⎝
 σ 2 
 
 σ ωη 
 
0
 
0
  σ ωη   σ 2  0 0
0
 
0
  σ  ε ω  2  0
0 0 0  σ  ε η  2 
 
⎞
 ⎟
⎠
. 
14 Elliptical distributions owe their name to the fact that the level curves of their densities are elliptical. 
The  construction via the same characteristic function, independently of the dimension, is standard (see, e.g., Fang, 
Kotz, and Ng 1990). See Mailath and Nöldeke (2008) for a model using elliptically contoured distributions in 
information economics.
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B. Timing
Timeline:
delegation
communication
receiver
chooses
institution
sender
observes
institution
sender
chooses
information
structure
receiver
observes
information
structure
sender
observes
signal
realizations
sender
chooses
action
sender
sends
message
receiver
observes
message
receiver
chooses
action
The strategic interaction unfolds as indicated in the  timeline.15 Firstly, 
the  receiver commits to an institution of  decision making,  d ∈  
=  {delegation, communication} . If she chooses delegation, then she  delegates 
both information acquisition and decision making to the sender. If she chooses 
 communication, then she retains the right to choose the action herself and only 
 delegates information acquisition to the sender. Note that the receiver is always 
forced to delegate information acquisition to the sender, because she has no time 
to acquire information herself. Secondly, after observing the receiver’s choice of 
institution, the sender chooses what information to acquire. Formally, the sender 
chooses the variances of the noise terms in the signals,  σ  ε ω  2 and  σ  ε η  2 . We call the 
joint distribution of signals and states an information structure. The choice of the 
information structure is observed by the receiver. However, the realizations of the 
signals are privately observed by the sender. Finally, actions are chosen according to 
the selected institution of decision making. Under delegation, the sender picks his 
preferred action policy. Under communication, the sender communicates with the 
receiver—formally, he sends a message to the receiver—and the receiver selects her 
preferred action, given the information that she has received. The receiver is unable 
to commit to an action policy before she receives the information.
The sender’s choice of information structure is observable but not  contractible. 
The sender therefore chooses the information structure with a view to using 
the  information to his advantage in the selected institution of decision making. 
The  analysis of the resulting trade-offs are the subject of the present paper. All 
 information structures are equally costly in our analysis. This allows us to focus 
on the purely strategic reasons to select different information structures.
C. Strategies, Beliefs, and Equilibria
A sender strategy consists of two parts. Firstly, for a given institution of  decision 
making,  d ∈  , the sender chooses a feasible information  structure;  formally, 
he chooses the variances  ( σ  ε ω  2 ,  σ  ε η  2 ) in the covariance matrix  Σ . Secondly, 
given  d = communication , given the information structure  Σ , and given a 
 signal  realization  ( s ω ,  s η ) ∈  ℝ 2 , the sender chooses what message  m ∈  
15 See Section VIII for a discussion of a variation with an alternative timing.
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to send. Formally, a pure sender strategy is a pair of functions   →  ℝ + 2 such 
that,  d ↦  ( σ  ε ω  2 ,  σ  ε η  2 ) and  ℝ 2 ×  ℝ + 2 →  such that,  ( s ω ,  s η ,  σ  ε ω  2 ,  σ  ε η  2 ) ↦ m . A mixed 
sender strategy is a  probability distribution over the pure strategies. The message space 
is sufficiently rich; we do not impose any restrictions on   . Given  d =  delegation, 
the latter part of the sender’s strategy is replaced by an optimal action policy for 
each given  information structure and signal realization,  ℝ 2 ×  ℝ + 2 → ℝ such that, 
 ( s ω ,  s η ,  σ  ε ω  2 ,  σ  ε η  2 ) ↦ y .
A receiver strategy consists of the choice of institution,  d ∈  , and, for 
 d = communication, a mapping from information structures and messages into 
actions,   ×  ℝ + 2 → ℝ such that ,  (m,  σ  ε ω  2 ,  σ  ε η  2 ) ↦ y . As is well known, the receiver 
never mixes over actions, due to the strict concavity of her payoff function in  y .
There is commitment to   and  Σ , but no commitment in the communication 
game. A Bayesian equilibrium of our game corresponds to the standard notion. For 
each observed information structure and each message, the receiver forms a belief 
over sender types who might have sent the message. The belief is derived from 
the prior and the sender’s strategy. The receiver’s equilibrium strategy maximizes 
her payoff given her belief and the sender’s equilibrium strategy. Likewise, the 
 sender’s choice of information structure and his message strategy maximize his 
payoff given the receiver’s strategy.
When analyzing the game we focus on the most informative equilibria for all 
possible information structures, that is, on and off equilibrium path. In particular, 
this implies that we do not allow for strategies where the receiver can threaten not to 
listen to the sender if the latter does not choose the receiver’s preferred information 
structure. We find this assumption reasonable in situations where the receiver has 
to justify her actions ex post to some third party. For example, a CEO may have to 
explain to the members of the board of directors why she took certain actions and 
what information she had when she made decisions.16
II. The Informational Environment
The purpose of this section is twofold. Firstly, we simplify our problem 
by  showing that it is sufficient to focus on communication about the sender’s 
posterior optimal action. Secondly, we explain the linearity properties of our 
environment and  discuss how information choices shape biases in decision 
making.
A. A Useful Reduction
Suppose the sender has observed the signal realizations  ( s ω ,  s η ) . Due to quadratic 
losses, the ideal policy from his perspective is to match the action to his  posterior 
16 Argenziano, Severinov, and Squintani (2016) allow for the case where the receiver can threaten with babbling 
and find that driven by this threat the sender will over-invest in information acquisition. We rule out such threats 
here. With a slight variation of our model—decomposing information further into public and private components—
we could account for any kind of off-path threats. In this case, communication with appropriate off-path threats 
would always dominate delegation.
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mean conditional on the observed signal realizations. Let  θ be the level of the 
 sender’s posterior mean,
  θ ≡ E [ η ̃ | s ̃ω =  s ω ,  s ̃η =  s η ] , 
and let  θ ̃ be the ex  ante random level of the posterior mean. Sender types with 
 distinct signal realizations that aggregate to the same posterior mean share the same 
ideal action and, more generally, share exactly the same preferences over any pair 
of actions. This makes it essentially impossible—that is, except on measure zero 
sets—to elicit the underlying signals from the sender.
LEMMA 1: Any equilibrium under communication is essentially equivalent to one 
where the sender’s message strategy is a function of  θ only and all sender types 
 ( s ω ,  s η ) such that  E  [ η ̃ | s ̃ω =  s ω ,  s ̃η =  s η ] = θ induce the same action. Moreover, 
any equilibrium can either be characterized by an interval partition of the support 
of  θ ̃ or is fully revealing about  θ .
The lemma is intuitive. As usual, we can think of communication as of recom-
mending actions. The value of his posterior mean is all the sender needs to know 
to compute his ideal action. The receiver would appreciate to know the individual 
signal realizations to compute her ideal action. However, the sender is almost surely 
not kind enough to reveal them. Lemma 1 allows us to eliminate the signals from the 
analysis and to focus on the sender’s posterior mean,  θ .
B. Information and Biases
Due to the elliptical joint distribution, the sender’s posterior mean is a  linear 
 function of the realized signals,  E[ η ̃ | s ̃ω =  s ω ,  s ̃η =  s η ] =  γ ω  s ω +  γ η  s η , with 
weights  γ ω ,  γ η that are independent of the signal realizations and moreover, 
 ( ω ̃ ,  η ̃,  θ ̃) follows the same joint distribution as  τ ̃ . The exact weights are provided in 
the proof of the following Lemma 2.
Everything is as if the sender observed the realization  θ of an aggregated  signal 
that contains information of use to the sender as well as to the receiver. The 
 covariances of the aggregated signal,  θ ̃, with the underlying state,  ( ω ̃ ,  η ̃ ) , naturally 
measure the informational content of the aggregated signal. The exact expressions 
of the covariances are17
(1)  σ ηθ =  σ θ 2 =  σ 2  
  σ  ε ω  2  _ σ 2  +  
 σ  ε η  2  _ σ 2  ρ 2 + 1 −  ρ 2   __________________  
 (1 +   σ  ε ω  2  _ σ 2  ) (1 +   σ  ε η  
2  _ σ 2 ) −  ρ 2 
, 
17 The equality  σ η θ =  σ θ 2 follows from the linearity of the updating rules.
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and
(2)  σ ωθ = ρ σ 2  
  σ  ε ω  2  _ σ 2  +  
 σ  ε η  2  _ σ 2 + 1 −  ρ 2  __________________  
 (1 +   σ  ε ω  2  _ σ 2  ) (1 +   σ  ε η  
2  _ σ 2 ) −  ρ 2 
. 
Intuitively, a higher precision of any signal increases both covariances and hence 
 corresponds to a higher informational content. The set of all second moments 
that can be generated by some combination of noise variances is denoted by  Γ 
and depicted in Figure 1, panel A. The extreme points of the feasible set are easy 
to understand. If the sender’s underlying signals are infinitely noisy, then both 
covariances are 0 (the origin in Figure 1, panel A). If the signal  s ̃ω is  perfectly pre-
cise and the signal  s ̃η is infinitely noisy, the covariance with  ω ̃ is  maximal, reach-
ing a level  σ ωη , and the covariance with  η ̃ takes value  ρ 2  σ 2 (the top left corner of Γ ). If the sender observes  η perfectly, then both covariances are maximal,  σ θ 2 = σ 2 and  σ ωθ =  σ ωη (the top right corner of  Γ ).
For convenience of the reader, we summarize these insights in the following 
lemma.
LEMMA 2: For any given  ( σ  ε ω  2 ,  σ  ε η  2 ) ∈  핉 + 2 , the vector of random variables 
 ( ω ̃ ,  η ̃ ,  θ ̃) follows a joint Laplace distribution with first moments 
 E[ ω ̃ ] = E [ η ̃ ] = E [ θ ̃] = 0 and second moments given by (1) and (2). 
Moreover, a joint distribution of  ( ω ̃ ,  η ̃,  θ ̃) can be generated through Bayesian 
updating from  signals  ( s ω ,  s η ) if and only if  σ ωθ ∈  [0,  σ ωη ] and for any given 
 σ ωθ = C,  σ θ 2 ∈  [ρC,  1 _ρ C] . 
Consider next how information  θ shapes ideal decisions if it is directly 
 observable. By construction, the sender’s ideal policy is  y s (θ) = θ . Again 
Figure 1
Notes: Panel A: the set  Γ of feasible second moments of the joint distribution of  ( ω ̃ ,  η ̃,  θ ̃) . Panel B: ideal choices as 
a function of the underlying information for a particular choice of information structure (dot in panel A).
ρ2σ2
σωθ
σηθ = σ 2θ 0
ys (θ) = θ
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due to elliptical distributions, the receiver’s ideal decision conditional on  θ is 
 y r (θ) = E[ ω ̃ | θ ̃ = θ ] = c ⋅ θ , where
(3)  c ≡   σ ωθ  _ σ θ 2 =  
ρ( σ  ε ω  2 +  σ  ε η  2 +  σ 2 (1 −  ρ 2 ))   ___________________ σ  ε ω  2 +  σ  ε η  2  ρ 2 +  σ 2 (1 −  ρ 2 )  .
The coefficient  c ∈  [ρ, 1/ρ] is decreasing in the amount of noise contained in  s ̃ω 
and increasing in the amount of noise in  s ̃η . The Blackwell-best information struc-
ture from each player’s perspective maximizes the variance of his/her ideal decision 
rule. The sender’s Blackwell-best signal maximizes  σ θ 2 and hence corresponds to 
the top right corner in  Γ . The receiver’s preferred signal combination maximizes 
var (c ⋅ θ) =  σ ωθ 2 / σ θ 2 , corresponding to the top left corner in  Γ .
Since  θ is privately observed by the sender, the relative informativeness of 
 information structures determines the way the sender is inclined to misrepresent 
his information. Define the bias  b (θ) ≡ (1 − c) ⋅ θ . If  c < 1 , then  b (θ) >(<)  0 
for  θ >(<)  0 and the sender has an incentive to exaggerate positive realizations 
( downplay negative realizations). In contrast, if  c > 1, then the argument is 
reversed. Finally, for  c = 1 , there is no bias with respect to using the aggregated 
signal  θ . Thus, the bias is endogenous in our model. Depending on what pieces 
of information the sender acquires, he has different incentives to lie about what 
he observed ex  post. We illustrate the bias resulting from a particular choice of 
 information structure (the dot in panel A) in Figure 1, panel B.
Due to the possibly partitional structure of equilibria in the communication game 
shown in Lemma 1, we also need to know how the receiver updates about  ω if she 
learns an interval around the sender’s posterior mean only. Conveniently, the linear 
updating rules extend to truncations on intervals:
(4)  E [ ω ̃ | θ ̃ ∈  [ θ ¯,  θ –] ] = c ⋅ E [ θ ̃ | θ ̃ ∈  [ θ ¯,  θ –] ] ∀ θ ¯ ≤  θ –,
where  c is defined in (3).
Consider now the marginal distribution of  θ . It is again a Laplace distribution, 
because all elliptical distributions are closed under linear combinations. More 
 generally, all properties shown so far hold for the entire class of joint elliptical 
 distributions (hence also for, e.g., the joint Normal distribution). The reason to 
assume the Laplace distribution is that it satisfies—in contrast to the Normal—the 
following condition (5). The updating rule for  θ ̃ conditional on truncations to the 
tails of the distribution is linear in the truncation point:
(5)  E [ θ ̃ | θ ̃ ≥  θ –] = E [ θ ̃ | θ ̃ ≥ 0] + α ⋅  θ – ∀ θ – ≥ 0. 
The Laplace satisfies (5) with  α = 1 . We embed the Laplace in the generalized 
 subclass of elliptical distributions that satisfy (5) in Section VII. These combined 
linearity features enable us to provide a closed form solution for the value of 
communication.
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LEMMA 3: 
 (i ) The joint distribution of  ( ω ̃ ,  η ̃,  θ ̃ ) features linear conditional expectations, 
 E[ ω ̃ | θ ̃ = θ] = c ⋅ θ with  c defined in (3).
 (ii) The linear updating rules extend to conditioning on truncations, (4).
 (iii) The marginal distribution of  θ ̃ is a one-dimensional Laplace distribution, 
and the tail conditional expectation of  θ ̃ satisfies (5) for  α = 1 .
We are now equipped to study strategic communication.
III. Equilibria in the Communication Game
We now investigate equilibria in the communication game for a given 
 information structure that the sender has chosen. Due to Lemma 1, any equilib-
rium is essentially equivalent to an interval partition on  ℝ for  c ≠ 1 , inducing a 
 countable number of distinct receiver actions. For  c = 1 , there is also an equilib-
rium  inducing an uncountably infinite number of receiver actions (for details see 
the discussion after Theorem 2). Our results are in line with the literature (Gordon 
2010). However, since we assume an unbounded state space, we have to prove 
everything from scratch. We state only our main results here and refer to online 
Appendix  B for details. As is  standard, partitional equilibria are characterized 
by indifferent sender types  a i n ≡  a i (n) with  n relating to the number of induced 
receiver actions. We let  a 1 n denote the first marginal type above zero.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that  c ≤ 1 .
 (i) For all  n , there exists a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric and induces 
2 (n + 1) actions (Class I ) and a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric 
and induces  2n + 1 actions (Class II ).
 (ii) For  n → ∞ , the limits of the finite Class I and Class II equilibria exist and 
correspond to infinite equilibria of the communication game.
 (iii) Within any of the two classes of equilibria, the sequence of first thresholds 
above 0,  ( a 1 n) n , satisfies  lim n→∞  a 1 n = 0 .
For future reference, we denote the limits of the finite equilibria as limit 
equilibria.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that  c > 1 . Then, in any equilibrium, the first threshold 
below or the first threshold above zero is bounded away from zero and at most a 
finite number of receiver actions is induced in equilibrium.
The important insight to take away is that communication is arbitrarily precise 
around the agreement point,  θ = 0 , in case  c ≤ 1 , and coarse in case  c > 1 .
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IV. The Value of Communication
The sender acquires information with a view to using it in the chosen institution. 
While it is straightforward to compute expected payoffs under delegation, assess-
ing the value of communication requires some work. To fix ideas, suppose first 
that the sender would naïvely transmit information  θ honestly to the receiver and 
the receiver would follow the optimal policy to choose  y(θ) = c ⋅ θ . In this case, 
the receiver’s expected utility would be  E [− (c θ ̃ −  ω ̃ ) 2 ] =  c 2  σ θ 2 −  σ 2 , while the 
 sender’s expected utility would be  E [− (c θ ̃ −  η ̃ ) 2 ] = c(2 − c)  σ θ 2 −  σ 2 . However, 
honest communication is not necessarily an equilibrium. In a partitional equilib-
rium, the sender reveals only that  θ belongs to some interval. Let  a 0 n = 0 and define 
 μ i n ≡ E [ θ ̃ | θ ̃ ∈  [ a i−1 n ,  a i n ) ] for  i = 1, …, n and  μ n+1 n ≡ E [ θ ̃ | θ ̃ ≥  a n n] . By the 
 linearity of conditional expectations (Lemma  3), the support of the receiver’s 
actions in a Class I equilibrium is  c ⋅  { μ −(n+1) n ,  μ −n n , …,  μ −1 n ,  μ 1 n, …,  μ n n,  μ n+1 n } . 
With a minor modification, a similar description holds for a Class II equilibrium 
(see online Appendix B for details). Before knowing which interval  θ belongs to, the 
receiver’s posterior expectation of  θ ̃ is a random variable,  μ ̃ . Likewise, let  v ̃2 denote 
the random variable that describes the receiver’s posterior variance, conditional on 
the interval that the sender reveals. The distributions of these random variables are 
derived from the marginal distribution of  θ ̃. The following lemma states that the 
functional forms of the expected utilities under naïve and strategic communication 
are the same.
LEMMA 4: The receiver’s expected equilibrium utility is
(6)  E  u r (c μ ̃ ,  ω ̃ ) =  c 2 E [ μ  ̃2 ] −  σ 2 .
The sender’s expected equilibrium utility is
(7)  E  u s (c μ ̃ ,  η ̃ ) = c (2 − c)E [ μ ̃ 2 ] −  σ 2 .
Intuitively, the amount of information under strategic communication is  E[ μ ̃ 2 ] , 
instead of  σ θ 2 under naïve communication. To see this, note that by a standard vari-
ance decomposition,  E[ μ ̃ 2 ] =  σ θ 2 − E[ v ̃2 ] . We can understand the receiver’s and 
the sender’s expected utilities as an intrinsic value of information net of a loss equal 
to the residual variance after strategic communication,  E[ v ̃2 ].
Figure 2 
Note: Intervals around the agreement point  θ = 0 get arbitrarily small as  n → ∞ .
c ≤ 1: 0
... ...− a ni a ni− a ni−1 a ni−1
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The difficulty at this point is that the equilibrium cannot be solved for in closed 
form. However, the convenient property of distributions with linear tail conditional 
expectations is that this is not necessary to obtain the value of communication in a 
limit equilibrium. Let  μ + ≡ E[  θ ̃ | θ ̃ ≥ 0] .
PROPOSITION 3: The equilibrium variability of the receiver’s posterior mean in a 
Class I equilibrium inducing  2(n + 1) distinct receiver actions is given by
(8)  E [ μ ̃ 2 ] =  2 _ 2 − c  μ + 2 −  c _ 2 − c  ( μ 1 n) 2 .
In a Class II equilibrium inducing  2n + 1 distinct receiver actions, the equilibrium 
variability is
(9)   E [ μ ̃ 2 ] =  (1 − Pr [ θ ̃ ∈  [− c μ 2 n _2 ,  c μ 2 
n _
2
 ) ] ) ⋅  ( 2 _ 2 − c  μ + 2 +  c _ 2 − c  μ 2 n  μ + ) . 
In a limit equilibrium, which exists if and only if  c ≤ 1, 
(10)  E [ μ ̃ 2 ] =  2 _ 2 − c  μ + 2 . 
For the Laplace distribution,  2 μ + 2 =  σ θ 2 and moreover, for any  c ≤ 1 ,  E [ μ ̃ 2 ] is 
maximal in a limit equilibrium.
The proof uses a “dynamic programming” idea, where the sender’s indiffer-
ence conditions replace the usual “optimality conditions.” We first compute the 
expected variability over the last two intervals in the tail of the distribution, con-
ditional on  θ ̃ ≥  a n−1 n . The value depends on  μ + ,  μ n n, and on the truncation point 
 a n−1 n ;  μ n+1 n can be eliminated using the linearity of the tail conditional expectations (5). Next, we treat the resulting value as a continuation value and use the indiffer-
ence condition of the marginal type  a n−1 n to compute the expected variability con-
ditional on truncation to  θ ̃ ≥  a n−2 n . The functional form of the continuation values 
remains the same. By an induction argument, we show that this property holds for 
an arbitrary number of steps. Expressions (8) and (9) provide the resulting values 
for finite equilibria. In limit equilibria,  μ 1 n and  μ 2 n, respectively, go to 0 and we obtain 
the closed form representation (10).
The amount of information transmitted in a limit equilibrium, which exists 
if and only if  c ≤ 1 , is simply a constant fraction  1 _ 2 − c of the total amount, 
 σ θ 2. The  fraction depends on the information chosen by the sender through its 
impact on the conflict between the sender and the receiver. The fraction is increas-
ing in  c and  maximal if there is no conflict,  c = 1 . Since both  c =  σ ωθ / σ θ 2 and σ θ 2 are  endogenous, the sender faces a trade-off between intrinsically more useful 
 information structures (high  σ θ 2) and transmittable information structures (high σ ωθ / σ θ 2). We next analyze this trade-off.
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V. Information Acquisition
We now turn to the sender’s choice of the information structure. We assume 
that sender and receiver coordinate on an equilibrium that gives them the  highest 
 possible expected utility in the set of all equilibria. Clearly, selecting the most 
 efficient  equilibria is exactly in the tradition of the communication literature 
 following Crawford and Sobel (1982).18
A simple argument shows that we can restrict attention to information  structures 
such that  c =  σ ωθ / σ θ 2 ≤ 1 . In this case a limit equilibrium exists and gives max-
imal utility. In particular, note that the information structure with the highest  σ θ 2 in 
the subset of  Γ such that  c ≥ 1 satisfies  σ θ 2 =  σ ωθ =  σ ωη , hence  c = 1. From (7), 
the utility gain from this information structure is higher than for any information 
 structure with  c > 1 . Formally,  c(2 − c)E [ μ ̃ 2 ] ≤ c(2 − c)  σ θ 2 <  σ θ 2 <  σ ωη 
for  c > 1 . The first inequality is due to the informational loss due to strategic 
 communication. The second inequality follows from the fact that the sender would 
prefer to take decisions himself. Finally, the most informative information structure 
for the sender within the feasible set for  c ≥ 1 is given by  σ θ 2 =  σ ωη . Intuitively, 
information structures where the receiver would overreact ( c > 1 ), have strategic 
disadvantages and are intrinsically suboptimal from the sender’s point of view.19
Substituting  E [ μ ̃ 2 ] from (3) into (7), we obtain the sender’s maximization 
problem,
(11)  max  σ ωθ ,  σ θ 2 c(2 − c)  
1 _ 
2 − c  σ θ 2 −  σ 2 ,
subject to 
  ( σ ωθ ,  σ θ 2) ∈ Γ, c ≤ 1. 
The solution to problem (11) shows that the sender cannot gain from acquiring 
information that is intrinsically more useful to him but that cannot be transmitted 
without loss.
THEOREM 1: The set of optimal information structures from the sender’s perspec-
tive is given by  σ ωθ =  σ ωη and  σ θ 2 ∈  [ σ ωη ,  σ 2 ] .
Based on the previous propositions, the proof is obvious. There are three chan-
nels of influence. Firstly, the sender values information structures that carry a 
higher informational content to him (higher  σ θ 2). It is immediate that for a fixed 
18 See also Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2008) for a more recent result in this tradition.
19 This insight hinges on the selection of the most informative equilibrium on and off path. If we allowed for 
selecting a babbling equilibrium off path, we could sustain any choice of information structure in  equilibrium, 
including the receiver’s most preferred one. However, since there exists no limit equilibrium in this case, the  analysis 
becomes intractable and it is not clear whether the receiver prefers this at all. As alluded to in footnote 16, we could 
deal with this case by decomposing the optimal actions of sender and receiver into a common  component and a 
private component, and allow the sender to observe each of the components with noise. All feasible  information 
structures would satisfy  c ≤ 1 . The receiver optimal information structure would then coincide with the one we 
get in Theorem 2 below.
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value of  c , the highest feasible variance maximizes the sender’s problem. Secondly, 
the  information structure impacts the way the receiver discounts the sender’s 
advice through the term  c(2 − c) . Thirdly, due to strategic communication, only a 
 fraction  1 _ 2 − c of the total amount of information from the sender’s perspective can 
be transmitted in equilibrium. For future reference, the fraction  1 _ 2 − c measures the 
effectiveness of biased communication in the Laplace case.
The combination of these effects results in a maximum expected utility for the 
sender given by
  E u s (c μ ̃ ,  η ̃ ) =  σ ωη −  σ 2 .
Since this is independent of  σ θ 2 the sender is indifferent between all the information 
structures in the theorem. For an illustration see the solid line in Figure  3. This 
indifference is a special feature of the Laplace distribution. The robust insight that 
we exploit in what follows is that the sender cannot gain from acquiring  information 
that he would individually prefer, because the added value of such information 
would be lost in transmission. As shown in Section VII, the sender strictly loses 
from acquiring intrinsically more useful information if the fraction he can transmit 
is smaller than in the Laplace case, or, as we term it, biased communication is less 
effective than in the Laplace case.
Consider now the receiver’s payoff as a function of the information structure that 
the sender chooses. For  σ ω θ =  σ ω η and any  σ θ 2 ≥  σ ω η , the receiver’s payoff in a 
limit equilibrium is
  E u r (c μ ̃ ,  ω ̃ ) =  c 2  1 _ 
2 − c  σ θ 2 −  σ 2 =  
 σ ω η 2  _ 
2  σ θ 2 −  σ ωη −  σ 
2 ,
ρ2 σ2 σ2
σωθ = σθ  σωθ 
σ2θ
2
σωη 
Figure 3
Note: The solid line represents the sender-optimal information structures; the dot  represents the Pareto optimum 
in this set.
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a decreasing function of  σ θ 2. Clearly, the receiver suffers if the sender chooses an 
information structure with a higher  σ θ 2; at the same time, the sender derives no 
 benefit from such behavior.
THEOREM 2: The set of sender optimal information structures contains a 
uniquely Pareto efficient element,  σ θ   2 ⁎  =  σ ω θ ⁎ =  σ ω η . The ensuing  communication 
 continuation game following the Pareto efficient information selection has an 
equilibrium in which the sender communicates  θ truthfully to the receiver, who 
follows the sender’s proposal one-for-one.
For convenience, we depict the theorem and the discussion preceding it 
 graphically in Figure 3. At the Pareto optimal information structure within the 
set of  sender-optimal ones, we have  c = 1 and the bias with respect to commu-
nicating  θ is eliminated. Hence, it is an equilibrium for the sender to  follow the 
 message strategy  m(θ ) = θ for all  θ , and for the receiver to follow the action 
strategy  y (m) =   σ ωθ ⁎  ___ σ θ  2 ∗  ⋅ m = m for all  m , because the receiver correctly identi-
fies  m with  θ in her belief. We call this a smooth communication equilibrium, 
because the equilibrium involves differentiable strategies in the communication 
game. Note that expected utilities in the smooth communication equilibrium are 
the same as in the equilibrium with countably infinitely many induced actions for 
c = 1 .20 In terms of the underlying noise, the sender is perfectly informed about 
the receiver’s ideal action,  σ  ε ω  2 = 0 . However, he remains partially  ignorant about 
his preferred choice,  σ  ε η  2 =  1 −  ρ 
2  _ρ  σ 2 , to convince the receiver of his  unbiasedness. 
There is no harm if the sender knows the ideal action of the receiver. By contrast, 
if the sender knew his ideal action, then the receiver would discount his advice and 
information would be lost.
We next turn to the receiver’s choice of institution of decision making. 
We assume that the sender chooses the Pareto efficient information structure out of 
the ones that are optimal from his perspective. Since this stacks the deck in favor 
of  communication, we give reasons beyond Pareto efficiency why our equilibrium 
selection is compelling after presenting our main result.
VI. Delegation versus Communication
Depending on the receiver’s choice of institution, the sender acquires  different 
pieces of information. Under communication he cannot gain from choosing his 
 privately preferred information structure and he is happy to choose information 
that is equally useful to himself and the receiver. Hence, the sender’s proposal 
also reflects the receiver’s ideal action instead of just the sender’s. The receiver’s 
expected payoff in the smooth communication equilibrium is
(12)  E u r ( θ ̃,  ω ̃ ) =  σ ω η −  σ 2 .
20 The smooth communication equilibrium is also optimal with respect to maximization of joint surplus of 
sender and receiver, as shown in Deimen and Szalay (forthcoming).
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If the sender has the right to choose the action directly (delegation), then he will 
follow the action policy  y s (θ) = θ for all  θ . This results in an expected utility for 
the sender of
  E u s ( θ ̃,  η ̃ ) = − E  ( θ ̃ −  η ̃ ) 2 =  σ θ 2 −  σ 2 ,
where we have used the fact that  σ η θ =  σ θ 2 by construction of  θ (see Section II). 
Obviously, the sender just acquires information that is privately optimal for him, 
i.e., he learns  η perfectly, so that the variance of his posterior expectation is maximal 
in the feasible set. Formally, he chooses  σ ˆω θ =  σ ω η and  σ ˆ θ 2 =  σ 2 =  1 _ρ  σ ω η . The 
receiver’s expected utility under delegation is
(13)  E u r ( θ ̃,  ω ̃ ) = − σ ˆ θ 2 + 2  σ ˆω θ −  σ 2 =  (2 −  1 _ρ)  σ ω η −  σ 2 .
Direct comparison of equations (12) and (13) reveals that communication is the 
 preferred mode of decision making, because  2 −  1 _ρ < 1 for any  ρ ∈ ( 0, 1) . 
Formally, we have the following result.
THEOREM 3: Suppose the sender selects privately optimal information  structures 
for both choices of institution and in case there are several optimal ones, he 
picks the receiver’s preferred information structure among them. Then—for any 
 underlying correlation of interests—the receiver strictly prefers communication 
over delegation.
The surprising insight is that this result holds for any underlying correlation 
of interests. The driving force behind our result is that the receiver’s choice of 
 institution—delegation versus communication—results in the sender acquiring 
 different pieces of information. Anticipating that he will have to talk to the receiver, 
the sender understands that he rather pays attention to the receiver’s interests. If he 
paid too much attention to his own interests, the receiver would simply discount his 
advice, neutralizing any potential gain to the sender. By contrast, under delegation 
the receiver gives away any influence and the sender has no reason to pay attention 
to what the receiver cares about. As a result, the receiver prefers communication 
over delegation.
The novelty is that the nature of the acquired information matters, under com-
munication the receiver can punish the sender for acquiring the wrong pieces of 
information. This explains why our result differs from what is known for the case 
of exogenously given information structures and biases.21 Indeed, if we assume an 
exogenously given information structure that coincides with the one chosen under 
delegation,  σ ˆω θ =  σ ω η and  σ ˆ θ 2 =  1 _ρ  σ ω η , our results are qualitatively in line with 
the literature: communication is strictly preferred to delegation for  ρ ∈  (0, 2/3) 
21 In particular, Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008) show that decentralized decision making is better than 
centralized decision making for small conflicts of interests whereas the reverse is true for larger conflicts. Dessein 
(2002) shows that delegation outperforms communication whenever meaningful communication is possible.
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and delegation is strictly preferred for  ρ ∈  ( 2/3 , 1) . This is due to the 
familiar trade-off: while communication entails a loss of information due to strategic 
communication, delegation results in a choice of action that is not ideal from the 
receiver’s point of view.22
Our model provides support for communication as an institution. However, as 
our discussion shows, the strength of this support depends on which information 
structure is selected among the optimal ones from the sender’s perspective. The 
advantage of the Laplace model is that it is simple. However, it does not produce a 
unique sender-optimal information structure, a point that we address next.
VII. The Effectiveness of Biased Communication
We now characterize environments where the sender strictly loses under 
 communication when acquiring information that he individually prefers. This is 
the case if the fraction of the information he can pass on is strictly smaller than 
for the Laplace, or as we term it, biased strategic communication is strictly less 
effective than in the Laplace case. The reason is that the effectiveness of biased 
 communication is more sensitive to conflicts in these environments, and as a result, 
the sender has incentives to acquire information that eliminates the bias. Hence the 
choice of institution impacts the sender’s choice of information and communication 
trumps delegation.
A. Generalized Informational Environment
To formalize these thoughts, we introduce a parameter  α ∈ (0, 2) that captures 
the informational content in strategic communication in our model. We assume 
that the marginal distributions of  τ ̃ have densities of the form
(14)  f τ (τ ; α) =  1 _ 2  σ τ  √ ____ 2 α 2  ____(2 − α)  (1 −  √ _ 2 _2 − α (1 − α)  | τ | __ σ τ )  2α−1 _1−α  
on support  T. 23 The density (14) nests the Laplace case with  α = 1 . The support 
for all  α ≥ 1 is  T = ℝ . For  α < 1, the support is the symmetric interval around 
0 such that the term in brackets is non-negative. An example with interval support 
is the uniform distribution with  α = 1 / 2 . The joint distribution is elliptical and 
constructed in the same way as the joint Laplace case via the characteristic func-
tion of the marginal distribution (14). As we explain in more detail below all lin-
ear conditioning rules of Section II apply (see Lemma 5). We hence call our class 
22 These two scenarios correspond to the most and the least pronounced effect of institution-choice on informa-
tion acquisition. For cases in between the extremes, qualitatively similar results hold. In particular, for  ρ < 2 / 3, 
communication dominates delegation, regardlessly of which information structure the sender picks. For  ρ ≥ 2 / 3, 
the comparison depends on which information structure is selected under communication.
23 The density can be derived for arbitrary, positive  α. However, in general it cannot be expressed in terms of the 
variance, which only exists for  α < 2. Since expected utilities are only defined for a finite variance in a quadratic 
loss model, we restrict attention to these cases.
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of distributions joint elliptical distributions with linear marginal tail conditional 
expectations.24
We illustrate the density (14) for different values of  α and variances equal to 
one in Figure 4. Relative to the Laplace distribution, densities with  α > 1 have 
a higher variability in the one-sided distributions, that is, more mass around 0 
and in the tails. Intuitively, more mass in the tails means that events with extreme 
 disagreement between the sender and the receiver become more likely. Naturally, 
this drives the value of biased communication down. More variability in the one-
sided distributions renders the effectiveness of strategic communication more sen-
sitive to conflicts, as we explain in detail in Section VIIC below.
B. Communication Trumps Delegation
Our main result generalizes as follows.
THEOREM 4: Suppose that a symmetric equilibrium is played in the 
communication stage. Then, for  α ∈ (1, 2) the optimal information structure is 
unique and given by  σ θ   2 ⁎  =  σ ω θ ⁎ =  σ ω η . The ensuing communication continuation 
game has a smooth communication equilibrium and the receiver strictly prefers to 
communicate rather than to delegate decision making to the sender.
The intuition for this result is extremely simple: deviating to an intrinsically 
sender preferred information structure hurts the sender because he can transmit 
less of his information. Moreover, relative to the Laplace case, transmitting all the 
 information becomes more important to the sender. We now develop the formal 
24 By symmetry, the characteristic function is a function of  t 2  σ τ 2 only,  Φ α (t ) =  ϕ α ( t 2  σ τ 2) . We define the 
 characteristic function of the multivariate distribution as  Φ α (t) =  ϕ α (t'Σt) , that is, we take the characteristic 
 function as invariant with respect to changes of the dimension. While the construction via characteristic functions 
is standard for elliptical distributions (see, e.g., Fang, Kotz, and Ng 1990), we are not aware of any contribution in 
the literature that describes the subclass of elliptical distributions with linear marginal tail conditional expectations.
fτ(τ ; α)
τ−1 1
1
Figure 4
Notes: The density (14) depicted for  σ τ =1 2 and  α = 1.5 (dashed);  α = 1 (solid) Laplace;  α = 0.5 (dotted) uni-
form. Note that the solid and the dashed line intersect again farther out in the support.
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details behind this argument carefully. The key insight is in the construction of our 
class of distributions.
LEMMA 5: If the distribution of  τ ̃ follows a joint elliptical distribution with linear 
marginal tail conditional expectations, then  ( ω ̃ ,  η ̃,  θ ̃) follows a distribution in the 
same class and the linear updating rules of Section II all apply. The density of  θ ̃ is 
given by equation (14 ) with  α ∈ ( 0, 2 ) . The variance of  θ ̃ is finite and related to  μ + 
via  σ θ 2 =  2  μ + 
2  _2 − α .
The defining feature of our class of distributions is the linearity of their tail 
 conditional expectations,  E[  θ ̃ | θ ̃ ≥  θ – ] =  μ + + α ·  θ –,  ∀ θ – ≥ 0 . This  condition 
can be restated as a differential equation that can be solved for the distribution as 
a function of  μ + and  α . Substituting for  μ + from the variance  σ θ 2 =  2  μ + 
2  _2 − α results 
in the density  (14) . Our value characterization (Proposition 3) extends to all 
distributions with these linear updating rules. With this at hand, our analysis 
 generalizes almost effortlessly.
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose the joint distribution of  τ ̃ is elliptical with linear 
 marginal tail conditional expectations and  α ∈ ( 0, 2 ) . Then, in any Class I (II ) 
equilibrium  E [ μ ̃ 2 ] satisfies equation (8 ) ((9)), with  c replaced by  αc . Moreover, in 
any such equilibrium,
  E [ μ ̃ 2 ] ≤  2 − α _2 − αc  σ θ 2.
If there exists a limit equilibrium in which the sequence of thresholds  ( a 1 n) n satisfies 
lim n→∞  a 1 n = 0 , then the upper bound on  E [  μ ̃ 2 ] is attained.
The linear conditioning rules allow us to get closed form solutions for 
the  equilibrium value of communication for any problem in which equilib-
rium  communication gets arbitrarily fine around the agreement point. The 
reason is that the value in a limit equilibrium depends only on the product 
 αc ,  E [  μ ̃ 2 ] ≤  2 _ 2 − αc  μ + 2 . Using the connection between the variance and  μ + 2 in 
Lemma 5 gives the upper bound in the proposition. Exactly as in the Laplace case, 
the sender can transmit at most a fraction of the total amount of information  σ θ 2,
(15)  2 − α _
2 − αc .
We define the effectiveness of biased communication as the fraction (15). For 
 c < 1 , (15) is strictly decreasing in  α . Hence the sender can transmit less informa-
tion in a limit equilibrium if  α is higher.
It is now straightforward to address the sender’s incentives to acquire 
information. We know that the upper bound on the equilibrium variability of 
choices is attained if the sender acquires information of equal use to the receiver 
and himself, so that  c = 1 . To prove the theorem, it suffices to show that the sender 
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strictly loses from acquiring any information that is intrinsically relatively more 
useful to himself, hence featuring  c < 1 for any  α > 1 . Using the upper bound on 
payoffs, we know that the sender obtains at most a payoff of
(16)  E u s (c μ ̃ ,  η ̃ ) =  max  σ θ 2,  σ ω θ c (2 − c)  
2 − α _
2 − αc  σ θ 2 −  σ 2 ,
subject to
  ( σ θ 2,  σ ωθ ) ∈ Γ, c ≤ 1 
where everything is as in the Laplace case except for the fraction of information that 
can be transmitted. To determine the upper bound we proceed sequentially. First, 
we solve for the optimal covariance for a given variance. For  α > 1 , the sender’s 
expected payoff is increasing in  σ ω θ over the set of information structures featuring 
c ≤ 1 . Hence, within this set,  σ ω θ ⁎ =  σ ω η . To achieve this, the sender becomes 
 perfectly informed about the receiver’s ideal action,  ω . Second, we optimize over the 
variance given the optimal covariance. The objective at this stage is
  (2 −   σ ω η  _ σ θ 2 )  2 − α _ 2 − α   σ ω η  _ σ θ 2 
 σ ω η −  σ 2 .
The first term is increasing in  σ θ 2. All else equal, the sender prefers intrinsically 
more useful information structures. The second term is decreasing in  σ θ 2, so infor-
mation that is more useful to the sender is harder to transmit. For  α > 1 the second 
effect strictly dominates the first one. Hence the sender abstains from acquiring 
perfect information about  η . As a result, equilibrium communication about  θ is 
conflict free.
In other words, if biased communication would perform badly, the sender has 
incentives to be unbiased. As a consequence, the receiver prefers communication 
over delegation when biased communication would be less effective than in the 
Laplace world. This proves the theorem, since information structures featuring 
c > 1 remain unattractive by the same arguments as used in our leading case.25
C. Comparing Environments
Communication trumps delegation in all environments where the effectiveness 
of biased communication is more sensitive to conflicts than in the Laplace case. 
In these environments (with  α > 1 ) , communication is notoriously difficult. To 
illustrate this, in Figure 5 we plot the share of the sender’s information,  σ θ 2, that 
reaches the receiver if the sender acquires perfect information about his ideal choice 
η ,  2 − α _2 − αρ , for  ρ ∈ ( 0, 1) .
25 Note that, in contrast to the Laplace case, the theorem makes a statement about symmetric equilibria 
only. The reason is that densities with  α > 1 are not log-concave, a property of the Laplace that we exploit to 
prove  uniqueness of equilibria inducing a given number of receiver actions.
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We do so for the three cases illustrated in Figure 4.26 In all three cases, 
information transmission about the sender’s posterior mean becomes perfect as  ρ 
tends to one. Even though there is a countable infinity of induced actions, expected 
utilities approach the level they reach if  θ is communicated truthfully. At the other 
extreme, as  ρ approaches zero, the amount of information transmitted in a limit 
equilibrium tends to the amount that can be transmitted with only two messages, 
indicating whether  θ is positive or negative.
To verify, a simple variance decomposition delivers the informational content 
of the binary equilibrium. By symmetry,  μ + 2 +  v + 2 =  σ θ 2. The first term captures 
the meaning conveyed by the messages, the second one the residual variance 
after communication. Using the variance expression in Lemma 5, we find that the 
 informational content of binary communication is given by
  
 μ + 2  _ σ θ 2 =  
2 − α _
2
 , 
26 For the Laplace case and the uniform case the value corresponds to the actual value of communication in 
a limit equilibrium. We have established existence of a limit equilibrium for the Laplace case, Alonso, Dessein, 
and Matouschek (2008) have demonstrated the existence of such an equilibrium in the uniform case. For the case 
α = 1.5 , we do not claim that a limit equilibrium exists. Our argument is that such an information choice is not 
part of an equilibrium even if an equilibrium attaining this value exists.
Figure 5
Note: The effectiveness of biased communication in a limit equilibrium for  α = 1.5 (dashed),  α = 1 (solid) 
Laplace, and  α = 0.5 (dotted) uniform distribution.
2 − α
2 − αρ
ρ
0 1
1
0.5
0.25
0.75
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reproducing the intercepts in the figure as claimed: two messages eliminate 
75   percent of the underlying uncertainty in the uniform case, 50   percent in the 
Laplace case, and only 25   percent for  α = 1.5 . The informational content of 
binary communication is an exact measure of the sensitivity of the effectiveness 
of biased communication to conflicts in our model. Since perfect information 
 transmission is possible for  c = 1 in all environments, environments are more 
sensitive to  conflicts if and only if the effectiveness of biased communication tends 
to a lower value as  ρ tends to 0.
It is now easy to understand when the shadow of communication has a 
 disciplining effect on the sender’s information acquisition and when not. In the 
uniform case, the sender is assured to convey at least 75  percent of his informa-
tion to the receiver, no matter what information he acquires. Vice versa, paying 
 attention to the receiver’s interest can raise the amount that is transmitted at most 
by the remaining 25   percent. It is thus natural that the sender simply acquires 
information about what he is interested in,  η , and just lives with the consequences. 
In contrast, eliminating conflicts raises the amount transmitted by a substan-
tial amount for  α > 1 . It is thus the environments where conveying meaning 
is  statistically difficult where the sender can be credibly punished for acquiring 
the wrong pieces of information. In these environments, the receiver prefers to 
 communicate, because delegation entails no possibility to punish the sender.
VIII. Reversed Timing
In our baseline model, the receiver chooses between the institutions of 
 decision making before the sender acquires information. Suppose now the 
receiver can choose between delegation and communication after observing what 
information the sender has acquired.
Adopting again the Laplace specification, we find that delegation is always the 
optimal outcome if interests are well aligned to begin with. The threat of forcing 
the sender to communicate thus has no bite. If interests are less well aligned, 
then the receiver would find it optimal to communicate with the sender if the 
latter acquired information about his own ideal action only. The sender dislikes 
 communication and acquires information about both ideal actions, to the point 
where the receiver becomes indifferent between communication and delegation.
THEOREM 5: Suppose the receiver chooses between communication and 
delegation only after the sender selects an information structure. Then, the 
shadow of communication partly aligns interests: for  ρ < 2 / 3 , the equilibrium 
responsiveness of the receiver increases from  c = ρ to  c = 2 / 3 .
For  ρ > 2 / 3 , delegation outperforms communication for any choice of informa-
tion structure. Hence, in equilibrium the sender chooses his preferred information 
structure and the receiver delegates. For  ρ ≤ 2 / 3 , the receiver delegates only if the 
information structure satisfies  c ≥ 2 / 3 and communicates otherwise. The sender 
has a strict preference to choose the maximally informative information structure 
with  c = 2 / 3 and select his preferred choice rather than choose any information 
structure with  c < 2 / 3 and communicate.
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In equilibrium, no communication occurs. However, the shadow of commu-
nication is still helpful. The sender would face losses from communication and 
dislikes this. The receiver dislikes these losses as well. However, her expected 
utility is affected in a different way, so she can credibly threaten not to delegate 
if the sender acquires the wrong information structures. As in the baseline model, 
the threat of having to communicate with the receiver makes the sender redirect 
his information acquisition towards information that he would otherwise neglect, 
and makes him look less into things that he would otherwise look into exclusively.
IX. Extensions and Conclusions
We compare two mechanisms of decision making, delegation and communica-
tion, in a situation of delegated expertise. The expert and the decision maker agree 
on the status quo but favor different actions if new information arrives. The expert 
chooses the precision of signals about each of the favored actions. His choice does 
not only impact the intrinsic usefulness of the information but also the conflicts that 
arise in communicating his advice. We derive a new communication model that fea-
tures these endogenous state-dependent biases. Moreover, we develop a method to 
compute closed form expressions for the equilibrium value of information despite 
the fact that equilibria cannot be computed in closed form. We describe a general 
class of distributions for which our procedure applies. Our environment allows us 
to measure the amount of information that can be transmitted in equilibrium, the 
effectiveness of biased communication. We find that in environments where biased 
communication is ineffective, the expert chooses his information in a way that elim-
inates any bias in communication. Put differently, an expert who wants to be heard 
by the decision maker will pay attention to things the decision maker is interested in. 
This effect steers the decision maker’s choice of mechanism towards communica-
tion. The reason is that under delegation the decision maker has no control over the 
expert; an expert who can choose the information and in addition can take the action 
will solely focus on his own interests.
Our model lends itself to many extensions, e.g., costs of information acquisition, 
opportunity costs of time, limited attention, simultaneous information acquisition by 
sender and receiver, endogenous roles of sender and receiver, and many more. We pur-
sue some of these questions in ongoing work. We believe that the closed form expres-
sions for the value of communication that we have obtained should prove useful in a 
variety of settings, for example, to study strategic communication in financial markets.
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